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CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND THE MARKETPLACE
OF FACTS
David S. Han*
The world is awash in conspiracy theories. Some are
relatively benign, with stakes rarely rising above idle barroom
chatter; for example, the NBA rigged the 1985 draft lottery via a
“frozen envelope” to ensure that the New York Knicks would
draft superstar center Patrick Ewing.1 Some, on the other hand,
can lead to staggering social harm; for example, some have
estimated that the South African government’s embrace of AIDS
denialism theories in the early 2000s led to the preventable
deaths of over 300,000 people.2 And some are simply
bewildering, such as assertions that the earth is flat3 or that the
fluoridation of water was part of a sinister Communist plot.4
These sorts of conspiracy theories—which can broadly be
described as patently false statements of empirical fact regarding
issues of public concern—raise interesting questions regarding
First Amendment theory and doctrine. As Frederick Schauer has
observed, free speech theory has traditionally centered around
ideological speech—questions of opinion, advocacy, and broad
*

Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. Many thanks to
Barry McDonald and to the participants of the First Amendment Law Review’s
symposium on “Distorting the Truth: ‘Fake News’ and Free Speech” for their helpful
comments and suggestions. All errors and omissions are my own.
1
See Chris Ballard, The Ewing Conspiracy, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
https://www.si.com/longform/2015/1985/ewing/index.html (last visited Oct. 16,
2017).
2
See Celia W. Dugger, Study Cites Toll of AIDS Policy in South Africa, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 25, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/26/world/africa/26aids.html
(discussing “President Thabo Mbeki’s denial of the well-established scientific
consensus about the viral cause of AIDS and the essential role of antiretroviral drugs
in treating it” and citing a Harvard study noting that “the South African government
would have prevented the premature deaths of 365,000 people earlier this decade if it
had provided antiretroviral drugs to AIDS patients and widely administered drugs to
help prevent pregnant women from infecting their babies”).
3
See THE FLAT EARTH WIKI, https://wiki.tfes.org/The_Flat_Earth_Wiki (last
modified Aug. 16, 2017) (“This website is dedicated to unraveling the true mysteries
of the universe and demonstrating that the earth is flat and that Round Earth
doctrine is little more than an elaborate hoax.”). The first question on the Flat Earth
Society’s frequently asked questions page is: “Is this site a joke?” See Frequently Asked
Questions, FLAT EARTH SOC’Y https://wiki.tfes.org/Frequently_Asked_Questions
(last modified Sept. 7, 2017) (answering the question: “This site is not a joke. We are
actively promoting the Flat Earth Movement worldwide. There are, admittedly,
several non-serious flat earth posters, but they are fairly easy to identify.”).
4
See Jesse Hicks, Pipe Dreams: America’s Fluoride Controversy, SCI. HISTORY INST.:
DISTILLATIONS (2011),
https://www.chemheritage.org/distillations/magazine/pipe-dreams-americasfluoride-controversy (describing conspiracy theories that fluoridation of water is
“known to Communists as a method of Red Warfare” and observing that such
theories were sufficiently well-known to be parodied by the figure of General Jack
Ripper in the 1964 film Dr. Strangelove).
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political, religious, and social “truths” not readily subject to
empirical verification—but has relatively little to say regarding
these sorts of factual assertions.5 On the one hand, there is a
strong common-sense intuition that the government should have
significantly more leeway to regulate, for example, a patently
false statement that antiretrovirals are useless in treating AIDS
patients as compared to, say, ideological advocacy of capitalism
or proletarian revolution. On the other hand, even socially
worthless false statements of fact can carry strong ideological
undercurrents or associations, such that regulation would raise
significant concerns regarding government abuse and
manipulation of public discourse.
In this Essay, I examine the constitutional boundaries
surrounding such speech. As I observe, a significant aspect of this
inquiry is the recognition that any patently false statement of fact
on an issue of public concern—even matters as apparently
mundane and ideologically neutral as the shape of the Earth—
can take on an ideological resonance, such that direct regulation
of the speech would raise substantial concerns regarding
government abuse. This strongly suggests that the government’s
capacity to regulate any such speech—whether overtly
ideological on its face or not—is highly limited, given the
strongly anti-paternalist nature of the American free speech
tradition.
It goes too far, however, to say that such falsehoods are
therefore completely indistinguishable from purely ideological
advocacy for constitutional purposes. Although any patently
false statement of fact on an issue of public concern is capable of
becoming the subject of an ideologically inflected conspiracy
theory, this does not mean that all such falsehoods are therefore
subject to full First Amendment protection in all circumstances.
There are limits to such protection, as indicated by the Court’s
recognition of particular contexts—such as defamation, perjury,
and lying to government officials—within which such falsehoods
can clearly be regulated. Thus, where the potential for
government abuse has been significantly circumscribed and the
social harms produced by such falsehoods are particularly acute,
the government may retain some constitutional latitude to
regulate such speech. I survey a few potential factors that might
be relevant to this inquiry—the type and degree of harm
associated with the speech, the means by which the speech is
disseminated, and the type of patent falsity in question—before
offering a few closing observations.

5

See Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 901–08
(2010).
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I. CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND THEIR PLACE WITHIN FIRST
AMENDMENT THEORY AND DOCTRINE
A. Patently False Statements of Fact Regarding Issues of Public
Concern
Conspiracy theories abound as to all sorts of different
subjects, whether politics, sports, religion, or science. Some of
these theories are relatively mundane, like the theory that the
spectacular failure of “New Coke” in the 1980s was in fact an
intentional strategy by the Coca Cola Company to rekindle
interest in the original formulation.6 Some are highly politicized
in nature—for example, assertions that Barack Obama was born
in Kenya,7 or that 9/11 was an inside job,8 or that the Clintons
are surreptitiously dispatching those who hold damaging
information about them.9 Some are downright bizarre—for
example, theories that airplane contrails contain chemicals used
for nefarious purposes,10 or that many prominent world figures
are shapeshifting reptilians.11
Many of these theories can cause significant social harm.
This harm might take the form of systemic discrimination or
dignitary harm to a particular group, such as that produced by
Holocaust denialism or the lies contained in the fabricated

6

See New Coke Origins, SNOPES, http://www.snopes.com/cokelore/newcoke.asp (last
updated May 19, 2011).
7
See, e.g., Anthony Zurcher, The Birth of the Obama “Birther” Conspiracy, BBC NEWS
(Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-37391652 (describing
the origins of the conspiracy theory).
8
See, e.g., Michael Powell, The Disbelievers, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/09/07/AR2006090701669.html (describing a Scripps
Howard/Ohio University poll of 1010 Americans in which 36% “suspect[ed] the
U.S. government promoted the attacks or intentionally sat on its hands, while 16%
“believe[d] explosives brought down the towers”).
9
See, e.g., Clinton Body Bags, SNOPES (July 7, 2016),
http://www.snopes.com/politics/clintons/bodycount.asp; ‘Clinton Death List’: 33
Spine-Tingling Cases, WORLDNETDAILY (Aug. 21, 2016),
http://www.wnd.com/2016/08/clinton-death-list-33-most-intriguing-cases/
(cataloguing the “33 people associated with the Clintons who have died the most
mysterious and often violent deaths”).
10
See, e.g., Democrats and Republicans Differ on Conspiracy Theory Beliefs, PUB. POLICY
POLING (April 2, 2013),
http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/2011/PPP_Release_National_Conspiracy
Theories_040213.pdf (finding, in a poll of 1247 Americans, that 5% “believe that the
exhaust seen in the sky behind airplanes is actually chemicals sprayed by the
government for sinister reasons”).
11
See, e.g., Conspiracy Theories: The Reptilian Elite, TIME,
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1860871_1860876
_1861029,00.html (describing the theory, set forth by David Icke, that major world
figures, including Queen Elizabeth, the Clintons, and Bob Hope, are actually shapeshifting reptilian humanoids that “have controlled humankind since ancient times”).
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Protocols of the Elders of Zion.12 Conspiracy theories might also
cause concrete, physical harm on a broad scale—for example, as
noted above, the South African government’s endorsement of
the theory that AIDS is not caused by the HIV virus is estimated
to have led to 300,000 preventable deaths.13 Or such theories
may cause targeted physical or dignitary harm to specific
individuals or businesses. For example, the “Pizzagate”
conspiracy theory—that Democratic operatives were running a
child sex ring out of the Comet Ping Pong pizzeria14—ultimately
led to a self-styled “investigator” firing a gun inside of the
restaurant,15 and Sandy Hook denialists16 have harassed and
threatened parents of the shooting victims based on their belief
that the incident was a “false flag” operation planned by the
government.17 There are thus often strong reasons for the
government to regulate such speech.
These sorts of assertions share a number of
characteristics. First, they are purely factual in nature. These
statements are not direct ideological advocacy arguing for or
against various political, religious, or social views—rather, they
are simply assertions of empirical fact.
Second, these are assertions regarding issues of public
concern—the sort of speech that the Court has broadly deemed
to garner the most stringent First Amendment protection.18
12

See, e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Where’s the Harm? Free Speech and the Regulation of
Lies, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1091, 1093–94 (2008); Brian Handwerk, Anti-Semitic
“Protocols of Zion” Endure Despite Debunking, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 11, 2006),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/09/060911-zion.html.
13
Dugger, supra note 2.
14
See generally Gregor Aisch, Jon Huang, & Cecilia Kang, Dissecting the #PizzaGate
Conspiracy Theories, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/10/business/media/pizzagate.htm
l?mcubz=0.
15
See Faiz Siddiqui & Susan Svrluga, N.C. Man Told Police He Went to D.C. Pizzeria
with Gun to Investigate Conspiracy Theory, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2016/12/04/d-c-policerespond-to-report-of-a-man-with-a-gun-at-comet-ping-pongrestaurant/?utm_term=.dd1423421939.
16
See Hunter Stuart, Sandy Hook Hoax Theories Explained: Why Newtown “Truther”
Arguments Don’t Hold Up, HUFFPOST (Feb. 11, 2013, 10:25 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/11/sandy-hook-hoax-theories-explaineddebunking-newtown-truther_n_2627233.html (discussing the conspiracy theories
surrounding the 2012 school shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School, including
the theory that the shootings were “a joint government-media operation to shore up
support for a federal assault weapons ban”).
17
See Frances Robles, Florida Woman Is Charged with Threatening Sandy Hook Parent,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/07/us/floridawoman-is-charged-with-threatening-sandy-hook-parent.html?mcubz=0 (reporting
that “a Tampa woman who thinks the Sandy Hook school massacre in Newtown,
Conn., was staged has been charged with threatening a parent of one of the slain
children”).
18
See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (observing that “where matters of
purely private significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less
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Although the Court has observed that “the boundaries of the
public concern test are not well defined,”19 it has stated that
“[s]peech deals with matters of public concern when it can ‘be
fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community,’ or when it ‘is a subject of
legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and
of value and concern to the public.’”20 It is certainly of legitimate
public concern whether, for example, political operatives are
running a child sex ring out of a pizza parlor, or Barack Obama
was born in Kenya, or 9/11 was an inside job. And the same can
be said for less overtly political conspiracy theories: it is of clear
public concern whether the earth is round, or whether the NBA
rigged the 1985 draft lottery, or whether the world is governed
by shape-shifting reptilians.
Third, the sorts of factual assertions that I focus on here
can be described as patently false—that is, they are easily and
objectively provable as false under whatever practical standard a
reasonable person can demand.21 This is therefore not the realm
of factual assertions that are empirical in nature but difficult (or
impossible) to prove, like the exact number of civilian casualties
in the Iraq War, or whether Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in
assassinating John F. Kennedy, or the validity of string theory.22
This is the realm of easily demonstrable falsity—statements that,
for all practical purposes, are clearly and objectively false.23
rigorous, . . . because restricting speech on purely private matters does not implicate
the same constitutional concerns as limiting speech on matters of public interest”).
19
Id.
20
Id. at 453.
21
See Mark Tushnet, “Telling Me Lies”: The Constitutionality of Regulating False
Statements of Fact 17 (Harv. L. Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No.
11-02, 2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1737930
(describing facts “established through the application of however high a standard of
assurance a reasonable person can demand”). This is of course a purely practical
judgment; on a metaphysical level, philosophers have long debated the extent to
which anything is truly knowable with certainty. See, e.g., Thomas Edmund Jessop &
Maurice Cranston, David Hume: Scottish Philosopher, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (July 26,
1999), https://www.britannica.com/biography/David-Hume (describing David
Hume’s argument that “natural beliefs are not obtained from, and cannot be
demonstrated by, either empirical observation or reason, whether intuitive or
inferential”).
22
See Ethan Siegel, What Every Layperson Should Know About String Theory, FORBES
(Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2016/11/25/whatevery-layperson-should-know-about-string-theory/#4eaf41935a53.
23
Of course, what exactly counts as a patent falsehood may be disputed. Some may
argue, for example, that an assertion that the CIA played an active role in the
Kennedy assassination is a patent falsehood, while others may argue that it is
reasonably plausible. And some conspiracy theories may turn out to be true; for
example, the CIA did indeed conduct clandestine experiments on unwitting human
subjects by dosing them with mind-altering drugs such as LSD. See, e.g., Tim
Weiner, Sidney Gottlieb, 80, Dies: Took LSD to C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES (March 10, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/10/us/sidney-gottlieb-80-dies-took-lsd-tocia.html. My focus here, however, is not on these line-drawing issues, but rather on
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B. Theoretical Considerations
Why might we want to protect these sorts of patently false
statements of fact regarding issues of public concern? Among the
standard litany of First Amendment theories, the “pursuit of
truth” rationale for protecting speech—that is, that unfettered
speech is necessary because the truth is best revealed through an
open marketplace of ideas24—provides the most direct
instrumental justification for protecting such statements.25
Under this rationale, even patently false factual assertions may
be protected because, as John Stuart Mill put it, allowing such
speech may produce “the clearer perception and livelier
impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.”26 In
other words, the marketplace of ideas would weed out such false
statements of fact, and in doing so, reinforce the truth of the
matter asserted.
As Schauer has observed, however, the most notable
expositors of the “pursuit of truth” theory of free speech—from
Mill to John Milton to Oliver Wendell Holmes—were primarily
concerned with the ideological “truth” produced by the
marketplace of ideas rather than factual truth.27 That is, they
were primarily concerned with “debatable matters of religious,
moral, and political truth”—like the merits of Communism or
the ways in which one should live one’s life—rather than
assertions of hard fact.28

the treatment of clear patent falsehoods like, for example, assertions that the earth is
flat.
24
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.”); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 87 (David Bromwich
& George Kateb eds., 2003).
25
See Schauer, supra note 5, at 911. As Steven Gey has noted, democracy-based
arguments “would not logically encompass the protection of those seeking to
disseminate empirically disprovable falsehoods,” as disseminators of such falsehoods
“can in no way be viewed as acting in good faith with their fellow citizens.” Steven
G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless Untruths, 36
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2008). Furthermore, there would be no justification for
protecting such lies under an autonomy-based argument for protecting speech, at
least under the traditional Kantian account of autonomy. See David A. Strauss,
Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 355 (1991)
(“If the capacity to decide upon a plan of life and to determine one’s own objectives
is integral to human nature, lies that are designed to manipulate people are a
uniquely severe offense against human autonomy.”). That being said, such theories
might justify some protection of false speech on the margins “as a price worth paying
in order that people may express themselves or in order that democratic
decisionmaking may remain unfettered.” Schauer, supra note 5, at 911.
26
MILL, supra note 24, at 87.
27
Schauer, supra note 5, at 902–08.
28
Id.; see also MILL, supra note 24, at 104 (distinguishing debatable subjects from
mathematical truths, for which there is generally no room for debate).
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With respect to such matters, “truth” is generally a matter
of personal conviction or social consensus, and speech broadly
operates by persuasion and advocacy. And as David Strauss has
observed, the First Amendment offers its strongest protection to
speech that operates in this manner.29 Patent falsehoods
regarding empirical facts, however, are intuitively different.
Because the truth of such matters is both clear and objectively
identifiable, such speech produces harm not by persuading
listeners as to how the world ought to be, but rather by providing
an empirically false impression of the state of objective reality.30
Thus, as Steven Gey noted, “The marketplace of ideas
justification for free speech provides a much weaker footing for
protecting expression that can be readily disproved than it does
for normative advocacy.”31
Furthermore, in most situations where the truth of a
factual matter is patently clear, false statements produce little or
no social value.32 Outside of the realm of abstract philosophy,
there is little value in asserting that one plus one equals three
rather than two. Nor is there any value in a patently false factual
statement that political operatives are operating a child sex ring
out of a pizza parlor. Although these sorts of false statements
may produce attempts to reveal the actual truth of the matter
asserted,33 we would be better off if such statements were never
made in the first place, given the time and resources wasted in
dispelling a patent falsehood. There is thus a strong intuition that
given the associated costs and benefits, the government should
have greater freedom to regulate, for example, the patently false

29

Strauss, supra note 25, at 334 (1991) (“Except, perhaps, in extraordinary
circumstances, the government may not restrict speech because it fears, however
justifiably, that the speech will persuade those who hear it to do something of which
the government disapproves.”); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–77
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[E]ven advocacy of violation, however
reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the
advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy
would be immediately acted on.”).
30
See Gey, supra note 25, at 8–9 (“Disputes about facts do not involve interminable
discussions about irreconcilable and unprovable normative judgments; rather,
disputes about facts can be resolved through the use of ordinary resources available
to assess objective reality.”).
31
Id. at 9; see also Geoffrey R. Stone, The Rules of Evidence and the Rules of Public
Debate, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 127, 139–40 (“[T]he counter-speech/marketplace of
ideas notion is far more compelling when we deal with ideas and opinions than
when we deal with facts than can objectively be proved true or false.”).
32
See Gey, supra note 25, at 2 (describing patent falsehoods like Holocaust denial as
“socially worthless and dysfunctional nonsense”). This is not to say that all patent
falsehoods, in all contexts, are devoid of meaningful value. In the realm of scientific
research, for example, efforts to dispel even patently false or absurd factual claims
might lead to deeper understanding of the truth. See infra note 37.
33
See, e.g., Aisch, Huang, & Kang, supra note 14.
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factual statements underlying the Pizzagate scandal34 as opposed
to broad ideological advocacy of capitalism or proletarian
revolution.
In addition, as many have observed, there are strong
reasons to doubt that the marketplace of ideas actually works to
identify “truth,” whether ideological or empirical in nature.
“Winning” ideas or facts are often determined by factors
independent of their truth value, such as the pervasiveness of the
speaker’s message; the “charisma, authority, or persuasiveness”
of the speaker; the extent to which listeners may want to believe
the statement; and so forth.35 And in the modern era of the
internet and social media, the open marketplace may be
compromised to the extent that people seek out and glean
information solely from an echo chamber of like-minded media
sources.36 The marketplace of ideas theory broadly assumes a
degree of rational detachment on the part of speakers and
listeners that is often not reflected in the real world.37
34

See Gey, supra note 25, at 2 (“If this type of speech is judged by a clear-minded
measure of costs and benefits, the costs of allowing the speech to occur seem to far
outweigh the benefits of adding a small quantum of total nonsense to public
discourse.”).
35
Schauer, supra note 5, at 908–10; see also Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 17 (“Due to developed legal doctrine and the
inevitable effects of socialization processes, mass communication technology, and
unequal allocations of resources, ideas that support an entrenched power structure or
ideology are most likely to gain acceptance within our current market.”); Steven
Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of
the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1281 (1983) (observing that the
marketplace of ideas theory “calls up the picture of a rational individual making
informed choices, and downplays the extent to which the inputs in a culture
influence the beliefs of the persons within that culture”); Alexander Tsesis, Free
Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1015, 1041 (describing the theory’s
failure to account for “the different access speakers have to means for influencing
truth seeking discourse”).
36
See Farhad Manjoo, How the Internet is Loosening Our Grip on the Truth, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/technology/how-theinternet-is-loosening-our-grip-on-the-truth.html (describing the echo chamber effect
and its dangers).
37
This is not to say that the marketplace of ideas theory is completely incapable of
doing any work in the area of facts. As is often seen within academic discourse, false
speech might serve as a mechanism for revealing truth: speech that initially appears
to be false can unsettle longstanding truths, and truthful propositions may sometimes
be strengthened by false assertions. See, e.g., Matt Simon, Fantastically Wrong: Why
People Once Thought Mice Grew Out of Wheat and Sweaty Shirts, WIRED (June 4, 2014,
6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/06/fantastically-wrong-how-to-grow-amouse-out-of-wheat-and-sweaty-shirts/ (describing how a series of scientific
experiments eventually disproved the widely accepted and long-held “truth” that life
could arise spontaneously from non-living materials); see also Aziz Huq, Easterbrook
on Academic Freedom, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1055, 1071 (2010) (arguing that although
“the conditions necessary for . . . successful operation” of the “marketplace of ideas”
theory “are absent for most of society[,] [t]he academy does manifest the necessary
properties to permit a functioning ‘marketplace’ of the kind valued by the First
Amendment”). But in most contexts, this direct value is generally limited when it
comes to patently false statements. At the very least, mere invocation of the
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Why, then, extend constitutional protection to this sort of
speech? As many have noted, the most compelling basis for
extending such protection is the strong principle of government
anti-paternalism and distrust within the American free speech
tradition.38 That is, regardless of whether the speech itself
produces any instrumental benefits, the government should not
interfere with the marketplace of ideas because such intervention
raises the risk of government abuse and manipulation of public
discourse. This broad anti-paternalism principle is uniquely
strong within the American free speech tradition, and it has
served as the basis for tolerating unquestionably harmful speech
that other Western democracies have freely regulated.39
Any constitutional protection afforded to patently false
statements of fact on issues of public concern would therefore be
rooted primarily in the principle of government distrust rather
than any broad sense of the speech’s instrumental value. As
Geoffrey Stone has argued, although false statements “have no
constitutional value” and are “destructive of public debate,”
prohibiting these statements would be “invalid because of the
danger of putting government in the position routinely to decide
the truth or falsity of all statements in public debate.”40 To afford
the government such power would raise a profound risk of
partisan abuse that would be highly damaging to public
discourse.41 Thus, as Gey observed, “[i]t is up to individual
citizens alone to sort out truth from falsehood,” because we must
“instinctively assume that the government does everything for a
political reason.”42
C. Doctrinal Considerations
It is an overstatement, however, to say that the
government is categorically prohibited from acting as an arbiter
of factual truth. As the Court has recognized, the government
constitutionally acts in this capacity in a wide range of contexts,
such as in cases dealing with false commercial speech,43 fraud,44

marketplace of ideas principle is insufficient to broadly justify the protection of
patently false statements of fact, as there are strong reasons to doubt the truth of this
principle in practice and it produces limited utility in most cases where the truth of
the matter asserted is beyond reasonable dispute.
38
See, e.g., Gey, supra note 25, at 20; Lidsky, supra note 12, at 1097; Schauer, supra
note 5, at 917.
39
See Gey, supra note 25, at 2–3; Schauer, supra note 5, at 916.
40
Stone, supra note 31, at 140.
41
See id.
42
Gey, supra note 25, at 21.
43
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976).
44
See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003)
(“[T]he First Amendment does not shield fraud.”).
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perjury,45 and defamation.46 And there is little reason to doubt
the constitutionality of, for example, prohibitions of false or
misleading speech in marketing securities,47 or lies told to federal
officials,48 or false claims about being a government official.49
In United States v. Alvarez,50 however, the Court made clear
that false statements of fact are broadly entitled to some degree
of First Amendment protection. In Alvarez, the Court struck
down the Stolen Valor Act, which criminally punished anyone
who “falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in writing,
to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by
Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States.”51 In
striking down the Act, the Court broadly deemed these sorts of
false statements to be protected speech, at least where the
government sought to punish such speech based solely on its
falsity.52
The splintered opinions in Alvarez, however, provided
only limited doctrinal guidance. Regarding the standard of
review, the four-Justice plurality—purporting to apply the purely
historical Stevens test for identifying categories of low-value
speech53—deemed the speech in question to be fully protected
and thus applied “exacting scrutiny” in striking down the Act.54
By contrast, Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the judgment, which
was joined by Justice Kagan, argued that intermediate scrutiny
was the appropriate standard.55 Both the plurality and the
concurrence did appear to agree, however, that the Act’s lack of
45

See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978) (noting “the unquestioned
constitutionality of perjury statutes”).
46
With respect to defamation, the Court has produced a set of rules allocating
different degrees of protection to different types of defamatory statements. See Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342–48 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757–61 (1985).
47
See SEC v. Wall St. Publ’g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“If
speech employed directly or indirectly to sell securities were totally protected, any
regulation of the securities market would be infeasible—and that result has long since
been rejected.”).
48
See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012) (prohibiting the making of false statements “in any
matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch”).
49
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 912 (2012) (criminally sanctioning anyone who “falsely
assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the
United States”).
50
567 U.S. 709 (2012).
51
Id. at 715–16 (plurality opinion).
52
Id. at 729–30.
53
Id. at 717–22. Under this test, a category of speech is deemed to be low-value if it
was amongst the “historic and traditional categories [of low-value expression] long
familiar to the bar,” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (quoting
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)), or if regulation of such speech was “part of a
long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription,” Brown v. Entm’t
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011).
54
567 U.S. at 724 (plurality opinion).
55
Id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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a requirement for “material,”56 “tangible,”57 or “legally
cognizable”58 harm was particularly problematic. There also
appeared to be some consensus across all of the opinions,
including the dissent, that falsehoods regarding the most
valuable speech—such as falsehoods regarding “philosophy,
religion, history, the social sciences, the arts, and other matters
of public concern”59—are broadly entitled to substantial
protection.60 As I have discussed elsewhere, this general
principle—which has since been embraced in post-Alvarez lower
court decisions61—directly follows from the Court’s longstanding
concern with chilling effects on the most valuable speech and the
potential for government abuse.62
II. IDEOLOGICALLY INFLECTED FACTUAL FALSEHOODS
If, as discussed above, the primary theoretical concern
with the government regulating false statements of fact is not the
value produced by such speech, but rather the extent to which
such regulation might be the basis for government abuse, then
one might argue that patently false factual statements regarding
issues of public concern can be distinguished from other lies
implicating high-value speech. It is one thing to regulate false
statements of empirical fact that are difficult or impossible to
prove (like the exact number of civilian casualties in the Iraq
War). Any such regulation would surely chill speakers and
provide the government with a powerful and far-reaching tool to
manipulate public discourse.63
But within the realm of patently false assertions like “The
world is flat” or “Anti-retrovirals provide no medical benefit to
AIDS patients,” such concerns may be more limited in scope, at
least in the abstract.64 Truthful speech is less likely to be chilled
if speakers need only steer clear of patent falsehoods in order to
avoid any risk of liability. Furthermore, any fear of government
abuse would be diminished, as there is broadly less reason to
suspect government mischief when patently false statements—
which are particularly worthless as compared to truthful speech
or difficult-to-prove falsehoods—are the sole focus of the
56

Id. at 738.
Id. at 734.
58
Id. at 718–19 (plurality opinion).
59
Id. at 751 (Alito, J., dissenting).
60
See David S. Han, Categorizing Lies, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
61
See id.
62
See id.
63
See id.
64
Cf. Lidsky, supra note 12, at 1098 (“If the State were only to punish the most
obvious and egregious forms of Holocaust denial, very little valuable speech would
be chilled.”).
57
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regulation in question. And although there may be slippery slope
concerns in play any time the government seeks to regulate
patent falsehoods, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that
careful and narrow regulation of such falsehoods will inevitably
lead to wholesale government commandeering of all
determinations of factual truth.65
As Mark Tushnet has observed, however, this is all
complicated to the extent that even valueless, patently false
statements of fact can be deemed “ideologically inflected.”66
That is, certain patent falsehoods are strongly associated with
particular ideological viewpoints. Holocaust deniers, for
example, will tend to be on the extreme right wing of the political
spectrum,67 while those asserting that George W. Bush had
foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks are unlikely to be
Republicans.68
The significant dangers of permitting government
regulation of these sorts of ideologically inflected patent
falsehoods are readily apparent. When the government decides
which patent falsehoods to regulate, it can effectively filter out
from public discourse particular political points of view or
particular sets of cultural or religious beliefs. Indeed, even if the
government is acting in good faith, any intervention into
ideologically inflected falsehoods risks altering the balance
within public discourse. There are, of course, compelling
independent reasons, apart from ideological bias, to regulate
patently false speech like Holocaust denialism, Obama
birtherism, or Pizzagate-like fake news. But this does not change
the fact that doing so gives the government a powerful tool to
shape the ideological balance of public discourse to its own ends.
Thus, although the Court has never opined on this
specific question, most scholars agree that these sorts of
inherently political false statements of fact would be entitled to
full First Amendment protection.69 Even if such statements are
65

See id. at 1099 (“[T]he European experience provides little evidence that
punishment of Holocaust denial is the first step on the slippery slope to tyranny,
though perhaps it is simply too early to tell where the path of punishing denial will
lead.”).
66
Tushnet, supra note 21, at 18.
67
See id. (explaining that some false beliefs are “associated with wider [political]
views”).
68
See Alfred Moore, Joseph Parent, & Joseph Uscinski, Conspiracy Theories Aren’t Just
for Conservatives, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2014/08/21/conspiracy-theories-arent-just-forconservatives/?utm_term=.c8483e8a82d0 (“Republicans were just as likely to believe
that President Obama was born abroad as Democrats were likely to believe that 9/11
was an inside job.”).
69
See, e.g., Gey, supra note 25, at 3 (“In the United States, . . . the nearly absolute
protection of political speech under the First Amendment prevents the government
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patently false and completely worthless, they are nevertheless so
strongly and clearly associated with specific ideological points of
view that direct government regulation would be particularly
troublesome, as such regulation would effectively open the door
to viewpoint-based targeting.70
But how far does this reach? Conspiracy theories like
Holocaust denialism, 9/11 truther theories, or Obama birtherism
are quite clearly ideologically inflected: each is strongly
associated with a particular political viewpoint, and this
association is broadly understood by both the public and the
government. But what about other types of patently false factual
assertions? Take, for example, the assertion that the Earth is flat.
One might reasonably view this assertion, in the abstract, as both
patently false and independent of any ideological inflection—it
is simply a clearly false statement regarding an ideologically
neutral fact.
In the realm of conspiracy theories, however, nothing is
ideologically neutral. There is ideological import in the very act
of rejecting something that is so clearly and obviously deemed to
be true by the general population. In other words, all conspiracy
theories—even those that do not appear overtly ideological on
their face—broadly share a singular ideological premise at their
core: that the public is being manipulated by nefarious powersthat-be, whether the government, or the vast right-wing
conspiracy, or the liberal media, or any other shadowy “they.”71
Thus, even purely factual assertions that, to most people, appear
ideologically neutral and objectively provable as true or false—
like the roundness of the Earth—carry a strong ideological tinge
to conspiracy theorists. Whether the Earth is round becomes, in

from imposing . . . punishments on Holocaust deniers.”); Schauer, supra note 5, at
915 (“Whatever the harms of public noncommercial factual falsity (and it seems hard
to deny that they are many and substantial), there is, in the United States, little basis
for arguing that dealing with these harms through government restriction is
constitutionally permissible.”).
70
See Stone, supra note 31, at 140; see also Gey, supra note 25, at 21–22 (“If the
government punishes the expression of factual falsehoods—such as Holocaust
denial—it does so because the statement of such facts are bound up with political
perspectives that the government seeks to undermine.”).
71
This is reflected in dictionary definitions of “conspiracy theory.” See Conspiracy
Theory, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/conspiracy%20theory (last updated Mar. 4, 2018) (defining
“conspiracy theory” as “a theory that explains an event or set of circumstances as the
result of a secret plot by usually powerful conspirators”); Conspiracy Theory, OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39766?redirectedFrom=conspiracy+theory#eid8
383475 (last visited Oct. 16, 2017) (defining “conspiracy theory” as “a belief that
some covert but influential agency (typically political in motivation and oppressive in
intent) is responsible for an unexplained event”).
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effect, a referendum on how much one should trust the powersthat-be.72
These sorts of conspiracy theories thus tend to be
attractive to the politically powerless—those seeking “an
explanation for the hidden and seemingly mysterious workings
of political power.”73 To such adherents, patent falsity is, in fact,
the central allure of these theories: the fact that the theories so
directly reject what is obviously true to society at large fits an
underlying ideological belief that society must wake up and
challenge all of our trusted authorities—including any “truths”
pronounced from such authorities—lest our apathy relegate us to
the role of helpless and manipulable pawns. Indeed, as Lyrissa
Lidsky noted, “denial of a conspiracy theory can often become
proof that it exists, at least for its adherents,” such that
government regulation of the patent falsehood in question may
in fact lend it legitimacy in adherents’ eyes.74
As a result, any patent falsehood on an issue of public
concern can potentially be deemed ideologically inflected, no
matter how ideologically neutral it may appear to be on its face.
An assertion that the Earth revolves around the moon, that one
plus one equals three, or that New York City does not actually
exist is a purposeful departure from conventional and obvious
truths held by society at large. As such, these sorts of assertions
can be viewed as shorthand for an implicit ideological position
that authorities cannot be trusted, that the public is inherently
naïve and manipulable, and that even the most seemingly
straightforward truths are actually the product of nefarious
agendas and machinations. In essence, the marketplace of facts
is inextricably linked to the marketplace of ideas: even if, on the
surface, the matter in question is purely empirical in nature, any
factual debate can effectively act as a stand-in for broader debates
regarding ideological truth.

72

See Lidsky, supra note 12, at 1100 (“Conspiracy theories provide an explanation for
the hidden and seemingly mysterious workings of political power, and they represent
a populist response to government secrecy.”).
73
Id.; see also MARK FENSTER, CONSPIRACY THEORIES: SECRECY AND POWER IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 68–74 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Conspiracy
Theories: Causes and Cures, 17 J. POL. PHIL. 202, 204 (2009) (“When civil rights and
civil liberties are absent, people lack multiple information sources, and they are more
likely to have reason to accept conspiracy theories.”).
74
Lidsky, supra note 12, at 1100; see also Sunstein & Vermuele, supra note 73, at 210
(“[A] central feature of conspiracy theories is that they are extremely resistant to
correction, certainly through direct denials or counterspeech by government officials;
apparently contrary evidence can usually be shown to be a product of the conspiracy
itself.”); Tushnet, supra note 21, at 19 (observing that counter-speech demonstrating
the falsity of a conspiracy theory “will often be ineffective” because “[p]eople with
[ideological] commitments may resist counter-evidence, come up with explanations
for why the proffered counter-evidence is itself false, and the like”).
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III. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE CONTOURS OF PERMISSIBLE
REGULATION
All of this suggests that even patently false factual
statements on matters of public concern—including assertions
that are not overtly political or ideological on their face—are
entitled to the same stringent protection afforded to direct
ideological advocacy. In the abstract, this determination comes
down to a judgment as to what represents the lesser evil: a public
discourse infected by patent falsehoods that create substantial
social harm, or a public discourse policed and “sanitized” by a
likely self-interested government actor.75 And the uniquely strong
aversion to any government management of public discourse
that is inherent to the American free speech tradition—even if it
is well-intentioned and might produce substantial benefits—
creates a strong baseline presumption of full constitutional
protection with respect to any factual falsehoods regarding issues
of public concern.76
This presumption would likely hold true in most cases
where the patent falsehood is disseminated by one who
genuinely believes it to be true—that is, the person who truly
believes the Pizzagate allegations, or that the Earth is flat, or that
9/11 was an inside job. As the Court recognized in the
defamation context, concerns regarding government abuse and
chilling effects increase as the degree of fault required by the
regulation in question decreases.77 Regulating patent falsehoods
under a negligence or strict liability standard—that is, extending
liability to falsehoods made without knowledge of their falsity—
would expand the scope of potential liability, thus increasing
chilling effects on speakers and opening the door for government
abuse through selective enforcement or biased decision making.
Conversely, regulating such assertions through an intent
standard78 would significantly limit the scope of liability,

75

See Han, supra note 60.
See id. (“[L]ies regarding the highest-value core speech . . . should carry a heavy
presumption of full constitutional protection, such that any content-based restrictions
of such lies are evaluated under strict scrutiny.”).
77
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334–37 (1974) (instituting a stringent “actual malice”
standard in defamation cases regarding public figures on issues of public concern due
to the dangers of chilling effects and government abuse).
78
In certain defamation cases, the Court has instituted the actual malice standard,
which it defined as “knowledge that [the statement] was false or . . . reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80. For present
purposes, however, I put aside the issue of recklessness, as that concept does not
really fit within situations where the speaker genuinely believes in patently false
statements of fact. See Tushnet, supra note 21, at 20 n.91 (“Reckless disregard
suggests inattention to the issue of truth, yet those who make ideologically inflected
76
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reducing chilling effects on speakers and limiting the potential
for government abuse.79 Thus, the absence of a requirement that
the falsehood be a knowing one would cut heavily in favor of
unconstitutionality.80
Furthermore, as Tushnet observed, when speakers
genuinely believe their patently false assertions, presenting them
with counter-evidence might lead them to abandon their views.81
And to the extent that—as discussed above—these sorts of patent
falsehoods can be conceptualized as manifestations of a
particular ideological mindset, confronting speakers with such
counter-evidence might ultimately lead them to rethink their
fundamental ideological commitments, in a direct application of
the traditional marketplace-of-ideas theory.82
What about intentional patent falsehoods on matters of
public concern—that is, falsehoods made by one who knows of
their falsity? Let’s say, for example, that I intentionally fabricate
fake news—like the Pizzagate scandal—in an attempt to sell
more newspapers or drive traffic to my website. Or I tell someone
that antiretrovirals are worthless in fighting AIDS and that it is
better for him to forego all treatment, knowing this to be false.
Or I knowingly make false assertions that the United States was
actually founded in 1850, and that the “official history” we have
learned in school was the product of a vast government coverup, simply because I know that these statements will draw
interest (and donations) from conspiracy enthusiasts. To what
extent should these sorts of intentional, patent falsehoods be
regulable?
On the one hand, an intent requirement, as discussed
above, drastically reduces the potential for chilling effects and
government abuse, given the reduced scope of liability associated
with a more stringent fault standard. And on an instrumental
level, there are few arguments that can be made for the inherent
value of such speech. There is no issue of counter-evidence
working to persuade the speaker if the speaker is already well
aware of the falsity of the speech. And it is difficult to identify
any meaningful value if the speaker’s ultimate goal is to
statements are ordinarily quite conscious of the evidence against the assertions they
make but disagree with its import.”).
79
Han, supra note 60.
80
See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 719 (plurality opinion) (“Even when
considering some instances of defamation and fraud, . . . the Court has been careful
to instruct that falsity alone may not suffice to bring the speech outside the First
Amendment. The statement must be a knowing or reckless falsehood.”); id. at 732
(Breyer, J., concurring) (“I would read the [Stolen Valor Act] favorably to the
Government as criminalizing only false factual statements made with knowledge of
their falsity and with the intent that they be taken as true.”).
81
Tushnet, supra note 21, at 18.
82
Id. at 19–20.
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accomplish social harm through the mechanism of deception.
There are thus strong reasons to characterize intentional patent
falsehoods on matters of public concern as truly worthless, such
that society would always be better off if they were never made.
On the other hand, if our primary concern with regulating
such speech is distrust of the government, then it perhaps should
not matter what the source of the falsehood is. Perhaps all that
matters is that the false assertion has been introduced into public
discourse, and that it is strongly associated with a particular
ideological point of view. Whether Pizzagate or reptilian
conspiracy theories were introduced intentionally by speakers
seeking to profit from knowing lies or in good faith by true
believers, once they enter the public discourse, they take on a life
of their own: they acquire adherents, whose belief in what seems
to the general public to be patent absurdity represents a particular
ideological position regarding the role and motives of various
“trusted authorities” within public life. Thus, although an intent
requirement might broadly limit the scope of potential
government intervention, it does not eliminate the fundamental
problem of the government affirmatively managing ideologically
inflected facts within public discourse.
There is, I think, much to be said about this issue—far
more than can be addressed in this brief Essay. But I will close
with a few thoughts as to what sorts of theoretical and practical
considerations might come into play in determining the
constitutional scope of the government’s regulatory power here.
As a starting point, it is clearly an overstatement to say
that there is no constitutional distinction between intentional
factual falsehoods on issues of public concern and pure
ideological advocacy. There are undoubtedly situations in which
such falsehoods can be sanctioned while abstract advocacy
cannot. For example, the Court has made clear that fraud,
perjury, defamation, false advertising, and lies to government
officials can be constitutionally regulated.83 So an intentional,
patently false statement on an issue of public concern could still
be punished as perjury if made under oath, and the Court’s
defamation jurisprudence makes clear that knowingly false
defamatory statements on a matter of public concern can be
constitutionally subject to liability.84
So how might we distinguish the sorts of intentional
patent falsehoods that the government can constitutionally

83

See, e.g., Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 717, 720 (plurality opinion).
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347–48 (1974).
84
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regulate from those that it cannot?85 Again, this broad issue can
be conceptualized as choosing the lesser evil between the
substantial social harms produced by intentional patent
falsehoods and the dangers associated with a public discourse
policed by a likely self-interested government actor. It therefore
follows that government regulation is more likely to be
permissible where the evils produced by intentional patent
falsehoods are particularly acute and where the risk of
government abuse is significantly limited in some manner.
Thus, as both the plurality and the concurrence in Alvarez
strongly suggested, the type and degree of social harm associated
with the falsehoods in question would play a significant role in
the inquiry.86 As Helen Norton has observed, “The more
generalized and less tangible the harms threatened by the
targeted lies, . . . the greater the concerns about selective or
partisan enforcement.”87 If the government seeks to regulate
lies—even intentional, obvious lies—untethered to any sort of
material harm requirement, its freedom to control public
discourse on this basis would be effectively unchecked, thus
raising significant suspicion of improper government motives.88
On the other hand, if the regulation is explicitly limited to
contexts where, say, concrete monetary or physical harm has
been suffered (as opposed to abstract or de minimis harms), there
would be less reason to fear government abuse, as the regulation
would be tied to particularly compelling circumstances where
85

As I noted above, as a purely doctrinal matter, the Court has purported to apply
the purely historical Stevens test in identifying low-value categories of speech. See
supra note 53 and accompanying text. As I have argued at length elsewhere,
however, the idea of a meaningfully objective, purely historical test in this context is
illusory. Because courts have substantial latitude to analogize the speech in question
to historically excluded categories of speech at varying levels of generality, any
“purely historical” determination is inevitably driven by the sorts of underlying value
judgments that the Stevens Court purported to reject. See David S. Han, Transparency
in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359, 383–91 (2015). Thus, the Stevens test
would not likely serve as a meaningful obstacle if courts were inclined to recognize
additional subsets of low-value speech. See id. at 392 (observing that “savvy courts
can easily translate strongly held value judgments regarding the speech in question
into facially neutral historical analysis by framing the speech in a particular manner,
selecting one particular historical narrative over others, and/or drawing analogies
broadly or narrowly”).
86
See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 718–19 (plurality opinion) (distinguishing the lies covered
by the Stolen Valor Act from historically unprotected lies like fraud and perjury
based largely on the absence of a “legally cognizable harm” associated with the lies
prohibited by the Act); id. at 734, 738 (Breyer, J., concurring) (focusing on the Act’s
lack of a “material” or “tangible” harm requirement).
87
Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 187 (2013).
88
Cf. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723 (“Were the Court to hold that the interest in truthful
discourse alone is sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, absent any evidence that the
speech was used to gain a material advantage, it would give government a broad
censorial power unprecedented in this Court’s cases or in our constitutional
tradition.”).
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tangible social harm is actually produced.89 This explains the
relative flexibility afforded to the government in regulating
falsehoods that constitute fraud, defamation, or perjury: each is
associated with direct, concrete, and material harms, whether to
individuals or to the day-to-day functioning of government
institutions.90
Also relevant to the inquiry might be the manner by
which the speech is disseminated. Let’s take, for example, a
patently and intentionally false assertion that antiretrovirals do
nothing to alleviate the symptoms of AIDS and that any
statements to the contrary are the product of a conspiracy
between the government and pharmaceutical companies. If this
assertion were made via a public pronouncement at a rally or in
a widely distributed book or article, it would tend to take on the
quality of an ideological assertion, even if the speaker is well
aware of its falsity. In effect, the speaker is injecting the patently
false assertion directly into public discourse, where, as discussed
above, the assertion might take on a life of its own, standing in
for a set of particular ideological beliefs.
By contrast, let’s say that I privately make the exact same
patently false assertion to only one other person—someone who
I know is particularly impressionable—for the express purpose
of causing him harm (that is, I know it will cause him to reject
his antiretroviral treatment). Although the assertion regards an
issue of public concern, any concerns regarding government
abuse would be more limited in this one-on-one context, as the
assertion is not directly injected into public discourse.91
Furthermore, when the assertion is made within this context—
particularly given the specifically targeted intent of the speaker—
it more closely resembles a purely mechanical means of bringing
about the specified harm, like hiding the person’s medication,
rather than an abstract ideological assertion.92 And, of course,
where there is an indication of this sort of highly particularized
intent to do direct harm on a particular target, there is less
concern with government abuse in general, given the compelling
regulatory interests associated with punishing or deterring such
89

See Han, supra note 60; Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 719–23.
See Han, supra note 60.
91
Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. a (stating that the violation of
a particular privacy right occurs only when one “gives publicity” to certain matters
and defining “publicity” to mean “that the matter is made public, by communicating
it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge”).
92
It might perhaps make sense to put this in the language of proximate cause: here,
the patent falsehood—although it regards an issue of public concern—seems to
connect very closely, directly, and foreseeably to a highly particularized material
harm. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104–05 (N.Y. 1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting).
90

197

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

conduct. Thus, where private rather than public dissemination
is involved, and where the falsehood is specifically intended to
directly harm particular individuals, the risks of government
abuse may be reduced, thus allowing for more regulatory
flexibility.
Finally, one might consider the extent to which the type
of false assertion and the conditions under which the assertion is
made short-circuit listeners’ ability to rationally evaluate its
veracity. Certain false factual statements on issues of public
concern might be clearly and objectively provable as false, but
may not be easily or practically identifiable as such by listeners
under the particular circumstances. Take, for example, an
intentional and patently false statement that a child sex ring is
operating within a certain house in the neighborhood. If the
assertion is made in a situation where, say, time appears to be of
the essence (for example, the perpetrators might flee at any
moment and never be found), then a listener may not have any
opportunity to evaluate the veracity of the statement before
intervening. Thus, a rational listener might simply assume the
truth of the statement—even if he actually harbors doubts as to
the statement’s accuracy93—and social harm may therefore result
from the listener’s actions.
This is, in essence, an incitement-like scenario,94 although
this context is somewhat different from the paradigmatic
incitement case.95 And similar to the incitement context, the
government may be entitled to greater regulatory flexibility here
simply because any harm produced by the falsehoods in question
would not be brought about by persuasion or the listener’s
unadulterated rational processes.96 Rather, the harm is produced
by pure misinformation that the listener cannot independently
evaluate,97 akin to telling a blind pedestrian that the light is red
93

For example, if the listener thinks the statement has only a 20% chance of being
true, he may nevertheless rationally intervene under a judgment that the high risk of
error is outweighed by the massive social benefit that would result should the
assertion prove to be truthful.
94
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (observing that the
First Amendment “do[es] not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”).
95
That is, the harm here may not be produced by directly inflaming the passions of
listeners to take lawless action. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 105–09
(1973) (per curiam). Rather, the harm may be produced by influencing sober-minded
listeners to act rationally under the circumstances based on false information.
96
See Strauss, supra note 25, at 339 (“[T]he risk of law violation can justify
suppression of speech only if the speech brings about the violation by bypassing the
rational processes of deliberation.”).
97
Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence.”).
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when it is actually green.98 In this context, factual falsehoods—
even those that may relate to matters of public concern—are not
operating as ideologically inflected assertions, and any
regulation would therefore present a relatively lower risk of
government abuse.
This is only a brief survey of factors that might influence
this theoretical inquiry; it is certainly not meant to be exhaustive.
Furthermore, to say that these factors may be theoretically
relevant to the analysis is not necessarily to say that any of them
is dispositive, or even that they must be integrated into the
doctrine. Structural and practical considerations must always be
taken into account in crafting doctrine, and there are many
standard reasons—such as concerns with chilling effects and
excessive judicial discretion—to prefer blunt and administrable
rule-like approaches as opposed to more tailored and
comprehensive standard-like approaches.99 These sorts of
considerations would ultimately influence any determination as
to which doctrinal factors should be used to distinguish between
different types of falsehoods.
In the end, however, it is worth reemphasizing that
anytime the government seeks to regulate factual falsehoods
regarding issues of public concern—whether characterized as
conspiracy theories, fake news, or anything else—the strong
presumption, which would hold true in most cases, is that the
speech is fully protected, such that any content-based regulation
would almost certainly be unconstitutional. Although, as I have
discussed above, the government may retain some flexibility to
directly regulate intentional patent falsehoods under certain
circumstances, any such regulatory freedom would be narrow in
nature, limited to particular contexts where the potential for
government abuse has been significantly limited and the social
harm produced by such falsehoods is particularly acute.
IV. CONCLUSION
As a purely intuitive matter, it seems somewhat strange
to say that the Constitution offers any protection to patently false
factual statements on issues of public concern, including those
that may cause grievous social harm. But when such falsehoods
take the form of a conspiracy theory, they are inextricably linked
to a singular ideological position: a radical skepticism of
authority that assumes we are all being clandestinely
98
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induce action by nonrational means is a false statement of fact. A rational person
never wants to act on the basis of false information.”).
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manipulated for nefarious ends by the various powers-that-be.
Thus, to allow the government unchecked freedom to regulate
such speech is to give it a powerful tool to control public
discourse—a result that is highly dissonant with the fiercely antipaternalistic posture of American free speech jurisprudence.
It is an oversimplification, however, to say that such
patent falsehoods are therefore always entitled to the same broad
constitutional protection afforded to abstract ideological
advocacy. Although I have made some broad observations as to
how courts might navigate and shape the constitutional contours
of such speech, we may ultimately never get very much doctrinal
clarity as to this issue. Few cases addressing this issue have
reached the courts,100 and even amidst all of the current handwringing regarding the dangers of fake news, little legislative
action has been taken to address the issue. Thus, in the end, the
issue may simply be settled by broad cultural consensus rather
than constitutional adjudication—a consensus that within the
American free speech tradition, considerable skepticism
regarding the intentions of the powers-that-be is, in fact, a good
thing, despite its costs.
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